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WRITINGS IN MAINE HISTORY
Books

Reflections on Peter Bradford’s
Fragile Structures
by
KENNETH M. CURTIS
Governor, State of Maine: 1967-1975

It was recently noted that East Machiasport was the site of
the first battle of the United States Navy in 1775 and then
wasn’t heard from again until Armand Hammer and Occidential Petroleum Company tried to build a refinery there.
After reading Peter Bradford’s excellent book, Fragile
Structures, it became evident that East Machiasport was
once again a major battlefield. This time it was the oil in
dustry fighting to maintain their strength within govern
ment and their stranglehold over American consumers.
The events recounted in Fragile Structures are vivid in my
memory. Having served as Governor as this amazing drama
unfolded, I can say from this experience that Peter Brad
ford, whose great intellectual capacity and ability I deeply
admire, did not yield to exaggeration. If anything, the power
and political influence of the multi-national oil cartel proved
more awesome than this book describes.

The recent energy crisis was not new to Maine and New
England, nor was it unforeseen. In 1959, when President
Eisenhower created the mandatory oil import quota pro
gram by Executive Order, New England and other areas
dependent upon a supply of foreign crude oil became the
victims of price and supply manipulation. Stated simply, the
Mandatory Oil Import Quota program provided, under the
guise of national security, that the United States could im
port no more than 12.2% of domestically produced crude oil.
The rationale was that our Country should not become over

ly dependent upon foreign sources. The program was ad
ministered by the United States Department of the Interior
and controlled through the granting of import tickets, large
ly to the major oil companies.

During the years of the program’s existence, the world
price of crude oil ranged from $1.25 to $1.75 per barrel be
low domestic prices. Therefore, an oil company holding im
port tickets could realize this differential amount for doing
virtually nothing while maintaining domestic prices at arti
ficially high levels.
The Portland pipeline was a good example of the effect of
this program that cost the American consumer over $50 bil
lion. Oil was brought to South Portland and piped to Mon
treal where Canadians were able to purchase heating oil,
after the cost of transportation, three cents per gallon cheap
er than the people in South Portland. New England, not
having a refinery and accounting for twenty per cent of the
national market for heating oil, was a lucrative and captive
market.

Few people realize that this region, despite all of its water
resources, is also dependent upon fossil fuels for seventy per
cent of its electrical energy. This almost total dependency on
outside sources of petroleum products made New England
vunerable to high prices and short supplies of heating oil
long before “energy crisis” became a popular phrase.
Nationally, some political leaders, such as Senator Lee
Metcalf of Montana, could see how ridiculous our national
policy really was, and how national security was being im
paired rather than enhanced by the import quota system.
Senator Metcalf was one of those suggesting that the United
States should cap domestic wells, store oil in salt domes, and
allow our consumers access to foreign oil as long as its price
remained below U. S. prices and it was readily available.
Had this been done, or had the mandatory oil import quota
program never existed, one wonders how effective the Arab
oil embargo would have been, and how much lower the cost
of gasoline, heating oil and fertilizer would be today. Would
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our rate of inflation have been less? Would the national em
ployment rate have reached 8$? One can only speculate at
the millions of people who may have starved in the undevel
oped nations because of the inability of struggling agricul
tural interests to absorb the massive increases in petroleum
prices.

In 1968, the political and economic leaders of New Eng
land decided to try, in the best yankee tradition, to help
themselves. Six Governors, twenty-five Congresmen,
twelve United States Senators, the New England Council
and several other groups agreed to take advantage of
Maine’s natural, deep waters and build a 300,000 barrel a day
refinery to produce heating and industrial oil.
The plan asked for no government financing. It complied
fully with existing law. But it required the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, who had the responsibility for par
celling out import quota tickets, as well as the Secretaries of
Commerce, Treasury, and the Army, who granted licenses
to operate a foreign trade zone. We were soon to discover
that our laws and our government responded obediently to
the demands of big oil.

In 1968, Maine filed its application for a foreign trade zone
in which to locate the proposed refinery. At that time, nine
zones existed in the United States. No application had ever
been rejected. The required public hearing, held in Port
land, drew an array of opponents, including high ranking of
ficials of virtually every major oil company, the majority
whip of the United States House of Representatives, the
Governor of Colorado, the Lt. Governor of Texas, and
representatives of the Governors of Louisiana, Wyoming,
Oklahoma, and Kansas.
So much pressure was applied before the hearing com
menced that an unprecedented second round of hearings
was scheduled in Washington to accomodate the Congress
men and Senators who were being pressured to oppose the
Machiasport Refinery.
The hearing process finally ended in October of 1968 and
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so, too, the Johnson Administration neared its end. The
game then became one of stalling. If the import tickets and
the foreign trade zone permit were not granted in a little
more than two months, the question would go to a new cabi
net. If Humphrey and Muskie won, we had a good chance. If
Nixon and Agnew prevailed, the battle was lost. Spiro
Agnew, at the request of President Nixon’s Secretary of
Commerce, Maurice Stans, had met with a group of oil
executives in Midland, Texas and had promised that the pro
ject at Machiasport would be killed anyway. But no deci
sion could be made by the Foreign Trade Zone board until
the transcript of the hearing was complete.
The time for additional argument was extended by the
hearing officer. C. R. Smith, the new Secretary of Com
merce, told us he didn’t have sufficient clerical help to speed
up the typing job. We offered to send State of Maine clerical
personnel to assist. When the first transcript was produced, it
contained pages of testimony from another hearing. Finally,
in five weeks instead of the five days it normally took to pro
duce the transcript, the document was readable.

In the meantime, my assistant, Walter Corey, was receiv
ing confidential information concerning Secretary Smith’s
relation with Dutch Shell. When information from these tele
phone conversations leaked out, a search revealed a small
transmitter concealed in a fireplace in Mr. Corey’s office.
The fall of 1968 brought the election of Mr. Nixon, and a
declaration from Secretary Smith that a decision would not
be made by the Johnson administration after all. An injunc
tion against the project was sought by Governor Hickel of
Alaska five days before the announcement that he would be
President Nixon’s Secretary of the Interior. As the clock
wound down further, Secretary Smith left the Department
of Commerce to be employed by, you guessed it, Dutch
Shell.

At the eleventh hour Senator Muskie and I met with Secre
tary of the Interior Stewart Udall, who was no friend of the
major oil companies. The Secretary pledged his help but re
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minded us that he answered to one man. The call, as feared,
came from the White House. No further action would be
taken by the Johnson administration. January 20, 1969
brought a new President with the Machiasport refinery ap
plications still pending.
President Nixon’s first action was to delay the processing
of the foreign trade zone application. He appointed a Cabi
net Task Force headed by Secretary of Labor George
Schultz to study oil import controls.

Secretary Shultz is a thoroughly honest and objective man.
His final report recommended that the oil import quota sys
tem be abolished and replaced with a tariff system. Brad
ford describes this report and the President’s response:
“Eleven months, twenty-five man years, 10,000 pages of
submissions, a total cost of not less than $4 Million, the first
real analysis ever made of oil import problems, a 400 plus
page report that all but called the quota system a $5 Billion a
year rip-off, and the President did one more thing. He re
placed Secretary Shultz as Chairman with Attorney General
John Mitchell.
The New England Governors next brought suit to have the
mandatory oil import declared unconstitutional. In the
meantime, the world price of crude oil climbed to domestic
levels. The program, no longer beneficial to the major oil
companies, was abolished by President Nixon. The energy
crisis arrived and the price of crude oil increased from some
$3.70 per barrel to over $12.00 per barrel in less than one
year. President Ford’s response has been predictable. He ar
gues that allowing more money for the oil companies
through higher prices will conserve energy and encourage
the search of new sources. Big oil still rules.

We now know that the Machiasport proposal was far from
an enviromental sound project. A nationwide awakening to
the need for enviromental protection arrived at the time the
oil industry wanted to build new refineries. As New Eng
landers continue to fight high prices, short supplies and a
continuing erosion of its industrial base, the same govern
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ment and oil forces that blocked Machias began rewriting
history. “It was the environmentalists that killed Machias/’
they said. That is a lie. Fragile Structures stands as the only
permanent record of the truth.
Bradford, Peter Amory. Fragile Structures: a Story of Oil Refineries,
National Security, and the Coast of Maine. New York, Harper & Row,
1975. 392 p.

Maine Catalog: Historic American Buildings Survey, Na
tional Park Service, Department of the Interior—A List of
Measured Drawings, Photographs and Written Documen
tation in the Survey—1974. Complied with and Introduc
tory Essay “The Historic Architecture of Maine” by Denys
Peter Myers. The Maine State Museum, 1974; vii, 254 pp.,
illus., paperback, $8.95.

As the shadows of bureaucracy lenghtened immeasur
ably during the New Deal, one of the few lasting benefits for
antiquarians was the Historic American Buildings Survey.
HABS was founded in 1933 to record significant American
buildings and to give employment to architects and drafts
men. For the next eight years, many important American
buildings were measured, drawn, and photographed. The
project stopped during the Second World War, and since
then it has been revived only sporadically. Teams worked in
Maine in 1960,1962, and 1965. The Historic Preservation Act
of 1966 gave HABS another transfusion, with the camera re
placing measured drawings in its work in Maine the next
year.
To date, only 162 Maine structures have been recorded by
HABS. These range from the State Capitol to churches, and
from domestic dwellings to lighthouses, banks, and forts.
Many of Maine’s best buildings are included—but not all.
While a national catalogue of HABS listings was published
in 1941 (with a supplement in 1959), state catalogues have
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appeared only in the last decade. The catalogue entries take
up just over one-eighth of this book, and they list infor
mation gathered on each of the structures inventoried. These
photographs, measured drawings, and data sheets are avail
able to the general public, with the normal delay and paper
work occasioned by any communication with a Federal
office.

The best—and most important—part of Maine Catalog is
Denys Peter Myers’ “The Historic Architecture of Maine.”
While it escapes top billing and is termed an introductory
essay, this fine exposition occupies over three-forths of the
book. The development of Maine architecture is traced
through the nineteenth century, with chapters on the early
Colonial, late Colonial, and the Federal periods, as well as
the pre- and post-Civil War eras. The nineteenth century is
featured, since it represents Maine’s golden age of building.
Many illustrations accompany the text, and Myers has done
an admirable and competent job in producing the best
scholarly architectural survey of the state yet done. Maine is
not an easy state to survey, since its size and disparate de
velopment in different periods result in a lack of homogeniety that was often found in the smaller early Colonies.
Each section has a good, brief histroical introduction, and
there is documentation in copious footnotes and a biblio
graphy.
The author was in charge of the 1971 photo-data project in
Maine and covers the entire state thoroughly. He refuses to
accept blindly pat attributions. Coventry Hall in York has
long been unnaturally linked with Samuel McIntire of
Salem, both at the expense of some unknown local builder
and in spite of the fact no documentation exists in the
McIntire papers at the Essex Institute. Myers comments on
this “tenuous tradition,” as he attempts to unravel Alexander
Parris’ association (or nonassociation) with the creation of
the McLellan-Sweat mansion in Portland.
There are few faults to find with the book, and they are
mostly in production, not in authorship. The soft cover,
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showing the handsome First Parish Church in Belfast in
color, is on the flimsy side, as is the binding—especially for
a $8.95 paperback. The typography is also a bit curious, with
the text set in smaller type than the footnotes, and the index
boasting the largest type in the book—a strange inversion
that should be a boon to readers of indices. The basic layout
is attractive, with the illustrations usually placed adjacent to
the applicable descriptive text. Surprisingly, the dates in the
captions refer only to the date of the HABS drawing or
photograph, and one must find the date of the structure it
self in the text. Only recent HABS photographs are dated,
with early views merely referred to as photocopies. The
Maine State Museum should be credited with the publica
tion of this volume, hopefully future works will see fewer of
these vagaries.

Maine Catalog has already generated much interest in the
architecture of the state. May there be more structures en
tered upon the HABS rolls, and may “The Historic Architec
ture of Maine” encourage more scholars to embark on deep
er, more detailed projects on the local level, all of which will
eventually enlarge our knowledge and appreciation of
Maine architecture even more.
Dean A. Fales, Jr.,
Kennebunkport, Maine

Journals of the Gloucester Experiment. Gloucester Com
munity Development Corporation, P. O. Box 15, Glouces
ter, Massachusetts 01930. 75C per journal. $5.00 per entire
series.

An abandoned, neglected old burying ground in Glouces
ter, Massachusetts, has recently been restored to beauty and
dignity, a heritage of the past from those who lie there. The
result is an honor to the town and a monument to the thor
ough study, the intelligent planning, and careful supervision,
and the hard work on the part of an enthusiastic group of
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men and wonmn, youthful and adult. Now, instead of an
area of fallen, tipped, broken stones and of uncut grass and
bushes and trees, defaced by vandalism, Bay View
Cemetery is an historic and lovely site in a picturesque old
town, pointed out to visitors with pride.

A further result of the scholarly restoration is of special
value to those interested in any aspect of old gravestones—
history, genealogy, epitaphs, designs and rubbing, restora
tion, respect to those of the past, or the refreshment of a
green acre of small park in a crowded modern enviroment.
This is the Journals of the Gloucester Experiment, a series
of eight reports on the preparations and procedures of the
restoration, each on a different phase of the project by a different leader. Especially valuable are Journals #1, “The
Restoration of Burying Grounds: The View Point of Grave
stone Artwork’* by Peter Benes; #3, “The Gloucester Pro
ject as a Social Experiment’’ by Paul Cook; and #7, “The
Archaeology of Colonial Burial Grounds” by Carole Lynn
Sharoff. Sharoff’s, the* longest one (11 pages), is especially
good as to procedures; it tells concretely what to do, why to
to do, and how to do it. Also helpful are #2, “Laws, Regu
lations, and Procedures Govening Historic Cemeteries” by
Coit Butler [Massachusetts, not Maine, laws]; #4, “Con
structive Landscape Restoration in Old Cemeteries” by
Carleton Lees, and #8, “Some Notes on Stone Conserva
tion” by Norman Weiss. Anyone interested in involving stu
dents in a similar project will find #6 helpful, “Cemetery
Restoration as a High School Course” by Elsa Martz.
Except for the two very useful articles on restoring ceme
teries by Theodore L. Brown in Maine Life (May, 1973, and
May, 1974) 1 find Journals of the Gloucester Experiment the
best guide to restoration procedures to date. Although it
goes beyond what the usual Maine community group or
individual is prepared to do, it presents reliable background,
sound information, and stimulating possibilities, as well as
detailed procedures in some of the Chapters.

Hilda M. Fife,
Maine Old Cemetery Association
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